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Ambiguous decision situations are characterized as having probabilities that 
are uncertain. The uncertainty is due to the common, real-world deficiency 
of information about the process by which the outcomes are determined. 
Thirty lotteries having uncertain probabilities were constructed by varying the 
centers and the ranges of the intervals within which the imprecise probabilities 
of winning could lie. Pairs of the lotteries were presented as choice alternatives 
to subjects, with each pair having lotteries with the same interval center but 
differing interval ranges. Ambiguity avoidance, the selection of the less am- 
biguous option, was found to increase with the interval center C, with ambi- 
guity indifference occurring for values of C s 0.40. No evidence of ambiguity 
seeking as the prevalent behavior was obtained. Ambiguity avoidance did not 
significantly increase with the interval range I?, but an interaction effect be- 
tween C and the ranges R, and R, of the choice pair was obtained. This effect 
of the ranges could not be described simply by knowledge of the difference 
R, - R,; knowledge of both individual values was necessary. The theoretical 
implications of these results are discussed. 0 1985 Academic Pren. Inc. 
Decisions in the natural environment often involve less than perfect 
information about the processes by which outcomes may be determined. 
For example, suppose a physician is choosing between two potential 
treatments for a diagnosed disease. One treatment has been used exten- 
sively, so that the physician has good information about its success rate, 
which is well known to be 30%. Alternatively, a new treatment is available 
about which the physician has little information. Should the physician 
express indifference between the treatments if the best guess as to the 
success rate of the latter, more uncertain treatment is also 30%? How 
should the physician behave if the latter treatment has a best-guess suc- 
cess rate of 35%? 
Many situations, as in this medical example, involve options which 
differ in the decision maker’s uncertainty about the available information. 
These situations share a common structure which can be abstracted and 
formalized as in Fig. 1. Each option is simulated by a gamble G having 
a probability P of a favorable outcome, shown as the positive amount 
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FIG. 1. Common lottery structure G and the notation used to describe the features of the 
lottery. 
SW, and the complementary probability of a less favorable outcome, 
shown as no payoff. As illustrated, it is only known that P lies within the 
interval [Pmin, P,,J, which is centered at C = (Pmin + P,,,)/2 and has 
range R = (Pmax - Pmin). All of the gambles used in the present study 
are operationalized using this form. 
Inherent in this formulation are two distinct types of uncertainty: un- 
certainty as to which outcome will occur, and uncertainty as to the like- 
lihood of the outcomes. Although distinguishable types of uncertainty 
have been the subject of recent speculation (Howell & Burnett, 1978; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), most decision models and empirical studies 
in the literature continue to assume that probability theory provides an 
adequate characterization of all the decision maker’s uncertainty. Knight 
(1964) and Ellsberg (1961) questioned this assumption in certain situa- 
tions. Whereas one’s uncertainty about decision outcomes is captured by 
probabilities, the uncertainty of “ambiguity,” using Ellsberg’s termi- 
nology, is not. Ambiguity is defined as uncertainty about the processes 
by which outcomes are determined, and has been characterized as un- 
certainty about the outcome probabilities themselves. 
For clarification, Fig. 2 illustrates probability intervals for several lot- 
teries, differing in center C and range R. The first two intervals were 
among those used by Ellsberg (1961), and are both centered at C = 0.50 
(Fig. 2a, 2b). Since ambiguity presumably increases as the range R in- 
creases (Becker & Brownson, 1964), these lotteries differ in ambiguity. 
The lottery represented in Fig. 2a might, for instance, correspond to 
tossing a fair coin. This is a well-known process which has no ambiguity. 
In contrast, the lottery represented in Fig. 2b most closely corresponds 
to a state of “ignorance,” which is probably rare in actual natural situ- 
ations (Coombs, Dawes, & Tversky, 1970). However, this lottery, having 
the maximum possible range of R = 1 .OO, implies the maximal ambiguity 
possible for gambles of this type. As another example, the lottery in Fig. 
2c is centered at C = 0.30, and might represent the second, newer treat- 
ment in the clinical decision example which opened this paper. With an 
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FIG. 2. Examples of lotteries with differing centers (C) and ranges (RI. 
intermediate range of R = 0.40, there is the supposition of an interme- 
diate amount of ambiguity for this gamble. 
Ellsberg (1961) suggested that many people, given a choice, would tend 
to select the option having lower ambiguity, exhibiting ambiguity avoid- 
ance. This conjecture has been supported empirically in a variety of con- 
texts: choices among lotteries (Becker & Brownson, 1964; Yates & Zu- 
kowski, 1976), foreign investment choices (MacCrimmon, 1968), clinical 
treatment choices (Curley, Eraker, & Yates, in press; Hamm & Bursztajn, 
1979), almanac-type questions (Goldsmith & Sahlin, 1981), and judgments 
of likelihood based on inference (Einhorn & Hogarth, in press). The 
strength of the phenomenon has been evidenced by subjects’ willingness 
to pay to avoid ambiguity (Becker & Brownson, 1964), and by the re- 
luctance of subjects to change their behavior after the presentation of 
prescriptive counterarguments (MacCrimmon, 1968; MacCrimmon & 
Larsson, 1979; Slavic & Tversky, 1974). 
Consider two gambles G, and G,, constructed as in Fig. 1 such that 
they share a common center C, but have different ranges R, and RZ. As 
a convention, G, is designated to have the larger interval range, so that 
R, - R, > 0. Having the greater range, G, presumably is the more 
ambiguous lottery of the pair. The present study focused on the effects 
of the three parameters which characterize these gambles-C, R,, and 
R,-upon individuals’ behavior when given a choice between G, and G,. 
In particular, three hypotheses were tested: (a) whether ambiguity avoid- 
ance increases as C increases; (b) whether, as C decreases, there is some 
value of C beyond which ambiguity avoidance will cease to predominate 
and, also, whether ambiguity seeking might obtain for even smaller values 
of C; and (c) whether the levels of R, and R, affect ambiguity preferences 
and, if so, whether knowledge of the difference R, - Rz is sufficient to 
describe any effects. We first turn to the claims of existing models re- 
garding these proposals. 
Several models would predict none of the stated effects. Among these 
are expected utility theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953; Lute & 
Raiffa, 1957) and subjective expected utility theory (Savage. 1972). Since 
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Ellsberg (1961) proved that persons’ nonindifference to ambiguity is not 
captured within models which use probabilities as the sole measure of 
uncertainty, these models would predict ambiguity indifference in all sit- 
uations. Also not predictive of reactions to ambiguity, without some fur- 
ther assumptions, are models in the spirit of Karmarkar’s (197Q in which 
decision weights are a function of the probability P. In contrast, prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which also uses weights which are 
a function of P, does make a further assumption which allows for ambi- 
guity avoidance. Specifically, it is claimed that the presence of ambiguity 
depresses the weight function, presumably with the amount of depression 
being proportional to the extent of ambiguity. Although prospect theory 
is not specific in its predictions, at the least, no effect of C upon ambiguity 
preferences is indicated. 
More relevant to the issues regarding ambiguity preferences and their 
relation to the gamble parameters C, R,, and R, are various theories 
which have been proposed specifically to account for subjects’ behavior 
in ambiguous situations. The first is that of Ellsberg (1961), which pro- 
poses a two-stage gamble evaluation process. Applied to gambles of the 
form sketched in Fig. 1, the first stage consists of reducing the range R 
of possible probability values to a subset of P values which seem “rea- 
sonable,” and are not ruled out. Among these is Pmin’, which is the lowest 
value in this subset, and is such that Pmin s Pmin’ < C. This value depends 
both on the amount of ambiguity in the situation as well as on the indi- 
vidual’s attitude toward ambiguity. In Ellsberg’s second stage, the subject 
behaves as if maximizing a convex linear combination of the center C 
and the minimum reasonable probability Pmin’. Specifically, let 
S = PC + (1 - p)P,i”,, (1) 
where p is a measure of the individual’s “degree of confidence” in the 
center C as reflective of the perceived likelihood of the favorable out- 
come. The model proposes that an individual chooses G, over G, if S, > 
St. In the present task, where both gambles share a common center C 
and R, > R,, Equation (1) implies that an individual chooses G, over G, 
when: 
P2c + C1 - P*lpmin’, 2 > Plc + t1 - P,lp,i,‘, 1. (2) 
Note that the range R, which is the only parameter which distinguishes 
G, and G2, affects the choice both through p and Pmin,. In particular, since 
G, has the greater range, p1 =Z p2 and Pmin’, , c Pmin’ 2 c C by assumption. 
These inequalities clearly preclude ambiguity seeking under any condi- 
tions. In fact, it is straightforward to show that the model predicts am- 
biguity indifference only when p, = p2 = 1.0, or when Pmin’. 1 = C while 
p2 = 1.0. 
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Regarding the other hypotheses of interest, there is no reason to ex- 
pect, from this model, any C effects. The model does predict range effects 
in that the extent of ambiguity is influenced by the parameter R; but not 
predicted is that R, - R, is sufficient in explaining these effects. It should 
also be noted that, although the model allows neither the possibility of 
ambiguity seeking at small values of C, nor effects of varying the param- 
eter C, Ellsberg in a later note (Becker & Brownson, 1964, footnote 4) 
did indicate a belief that both of these claims would obtain. 
Related to Ellsberg’s model are two models which allow for ambiguity 
seeking through the inclusion of an additional parameter which differ- 
entially weights values of P in the interval [Pmin, P,,,] that are less than 
C as compared to values of P in this interval that are greater than C 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, in press; Toda & Shuford, 1965). Although Einhorn 
and Hogarth’s model concerns probability judgments, rather than 
choices, and Toda and Shuford’s model considers only the case of C = 
0.50, the models appear to predict that range effects would obtain in a 
manner similar to the Ellsberg (1961) model. Less clearly indicated by 
such a differential weighting process are effects of the level of C, including 
the possibility of ambiguity seeking at low values of C. Einhorn and 
Hogarth do claim that the differential weighting parameter varies as C 
varies, thus allowing for these hypothesized effects. 
Another model which resembles Ellsberg’s (1961) model is that of Gar- 
denfors and Sahlin (1982, 1983). Their model, in the present situation, is 
essentially a special case of Ellsberg’s model, in which p = 0 in Equation 
(1). Thus, the choice model in Equation (2) reduces to choosing G? over 
Gl if Pmin’, 2 > Pmin’, 1. Being a special case, the predictions of this model 
for the three hypotheses of this study are similar to those of the Ellsberg 
model. One difference is their specific conceptualization of those prob- 
abilities included in the “reasonable” subset of [Pmin, P,,,] leading to 
the specification of Pmin’. They propose a “wave effect” such that Pm,,, 
tends toward C as C decreases. As such, their model predicts that am- 
biguity avoidance would decrease as C decreases. However, since the 
probability interval for G, is a subset of that for G,, it is always the case 
that Pmin’, 1 s Pmin’ 2. Thus, like Ellsberg’s model, the Gardenfors and 
Sahlin model would not predict ambiguity seeking under any conditions 
in the present type of situation. 
The final model to be considered is that of Becker and Brownson 
(1964). They proposed that the extent of ambiguity, and ambiguity avoid- 
ance, is a linear function of the difference R, - R,. Becker and Brownson 
found support for this, our third hypothesis, holding C constant at 0.50. 
No effect of varying C is claimed in this model. The present study sought 
to replicate their finding at C = 0.50, and to test its generalizability to 
other values of C. 
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In this regard, the positive correlation between R, - R, and ambiguity 
preferences has seemingly been contradicted by data reported by Larson 
(1980) and Yates and Zukowski (1976). However, these latter two studies 
adopted an operational definition of an ambiguous probability as one 
described by a well-specified second-order probability distribution. Such 
a distribution need not, and in these studies did not, involve uncertainty 
about the process of outcome determination. Whether second-order dis- 
tributions could profitably be used in decision theory is the subject of 
considerable debate (Borch, 1975; De Finetti, 1977; Marschak et al., 
1975), but this debate is distinct from the present line of research. Being 
well specified, these distributions do not involve uncertainty about the 
process by which outcomes are determined, and, as such, lack ambiguity. 
Subjects 
METHOD 
Eighty undergraduates at the University of Michigan participated in 
fulfillment of a requirement of several introductory psychology courses. 
Subjects worked individually through a response booklet after the pro- 
cedure was described to them. 
Materials 
Znstructions. A pamphlet described the study for the subjects. It was 
explained that the experiment involved pairs of lotteries, each having two 
possible outcomes-to win $5 or nothing; and that preference was to be 
indicated for one of the lotteries in each pair. Also described was the 
procedure by which the subject might actually play one of the selected 
lotteries. This was an incentive for the subject to think carefully about 
the choices, more so than if they were completely hypothetical. 
The common procedure by which all the lotteries would be played 
involved six steps, which were explained in the instruction booklet. Lot- 
tery L on the left side of Figure 3 was used to exemplify these steps: 
1. The subject receives a bag of unknown contents, except as specified 
under “Initial Bag.” 
2. The subject selects red or white as the winning chip color. 
3. The subject adds the number of chips designated in the “You Add” 
section of the display, bringing the total number of chips in the bag to 
100, as displayed in the “Final Bag” section, which summarizes the lot- 
tery. 
4. The subject draws a chip without looking. 
5. If a winning chip is drawn, the subject receives $5; if otherwise, 
nothing is received. 
6. The subject may check that the bag contains what it is said to con- 
tain. 
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SAMPLE 
Lottery L -- 
0-20 WHITE chips 
Initial 60~: o-2o REO chips 
20 Tatal chips 
You Add: 
45 WINNING chips 
35 LOSING chips 
45-65 WINNING chips 
Fi”a’ Bag’35-55LOSlNG chips 
100 Total chips 
CHOICE: 
Lottery L - 
RATING: 
Lottery R 
lnitiol Bag: Empty 
you Add: 25 WINNING chips 
75 LOSING chips 
Fin01 Bag: 25 WINNING chips 
75 LOSING chips 
100 Total chips 
Lottery R- 
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FIG. 3. Sample response sheet. 
Finally, the instructions explained the responses that would be re- 
quired . 
Response booklet. Each page in the response booklet displayed a pair 
of lotteries and a response area. A sample sheet is shown in Fig. 3. Two 
responses were required for each pair: a forced choice of one lottery or 
the other, and a “strength of preference” rating, which was translated 
into a 2I-point scale, with - 10 corresponding to a strong preference for 
the higher range lottery and + 10 corresponding to the complementary 
preference for the lower range lottery of the pair. 
Lottery pairs. There were 30 lotteries used in the study, all of the form 
illustrated in Fig. 1. These lotteries shared common outcomes, with $W 
= $5, but they differed in their values for the center C and the range R 
of the probability interval. The interval centers were varied from C = 
0.10 to C = 0.90; the ranges of these intervals were also varied to span 
the domain of possible values, from R = 0.00 to R = 1.00. The specific 
lotteries employed are displayed in Fig. 4, which describes the number 
of winning chips, out of 100 total chips, which comprised each of the 
lotteries. Each lottery in this matrix format is characterized by its center 
C and its range R. The 30 lottery pairs presented to the subjects are 
denoted by connecting arcs in the matrix. Five of these pairs, those con- 
nected by double arcs, were presented twice to each subject. 
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FIG. 4. The number of winning chips, out of 100 total chips, for each of the thirty lotteries 
used in the study. Each lottery is characterized by its interval range R, the columns of the 
display, and its interval center C, the rows of the display. Arcs connect the 30 lottery pairs 
included in the study. 
Procedure 
Each subject responded to all 30 lottery pairs in Fig. 4. The order of 
the pairs in the response booklets was varied randomly under the con- 
straint that pairs presented twice were separated from each other by at 
least three other pairs. The left-right placement of the lotteries within 
each pair was also varied to make two forms of the response booklet. 
For the replicated pairs, the two lotteries were left-right reversed within 
each response booklet; for the nonreplicated pairs, the two lotteries were 
left-right reversed between the two forms, so that the higher range lot- 
tery of the pair was on the left side of the response sheet for exactly 15 
of the 30 pairs. 
Each subject was presented with a copy of the instructions, which the 
subject read and kept for reference throughout the experiment. In the 
instruction booklet, and verbally, it was emphasized (a) that the fairness 
of each gamble was guaranteed by the procedure, and (b) that, at the end 
of the experiment, the subject would have a chance to play one of the 
lotteries and possibly win $5. As a final check, the subject completed the 
sample response sheet displayed in Fig. 3. Note that this is not one of 
the lottery pairs included in the response booklet. The subject then com- 
pleted the response booklet with the instruction to proceed through it 
from beginning to end without going back to check previous responses. 
Upon completion of the booklet, feedback was provided and a coin 
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toss was called by the subject. If the call was successful, one of the 
response pages was randomly selected, and the lottery chosen by the 
subject on that page was played according to the lottery procedure, with 
the subject either winning $5 or nothing. 
RESULTS 
No systematic differences were found between males and females or 
between the two forms of response booklet used. Three subjects gave at 
least one strength of preference rating that was inconsistent with their 
choice: one subject had 28 out of 30 inconsistencies, one had 11 incon- 
sistencies, and one had 4 inconsistencies. These subjects were excluded 
from the analyses, leaving the sample size at N = 77. The consistency 
of the subjects was believed acceptable; based on the five pairs with 
replications, the questionnaire had a Spearman-Brown reliability coefti- 
cient of .92. 
Effect of the Interval Center 
As illustrated in Fig. 4, the interval center C was varied for three fixed 
levels of lottery pair ranges R, and R,: R, = 0.20 versus R, = 0.00; R, 
= 0.40 versus R, = 0.00; and R, = 0.40 versus R, = 0.20. Figure 5 
shows the mean strength of preference ratings as a function of C for each 
of the three combinations of R, and R,. Figure 6 contains analogous 
graphs, with mean rating being replaced by the percentage of subjects 
choosing the less ambiguous lottery of the pair, that having range R,. As 
shown, similar results obtained with both aggregate measures of ambi- 
guity preference. 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and trend analyses were 
applied to each of the three sets of strength of preference ratings in Fig. 
5. For R, = 0.20 versus R, = 0.00, there was a significant effect for C 
on mean rating [F( 11, 825) = 9.378, p < .OOl]; trend analyses indicated 
significant first-order linear [F(l) 825) = 90.499, p < .OOl] and fifth-order 
[F(1,825) = 4.332, p < .05] effects. For R, = 0.40 versus R, = 0.00, 
there was also a significant effect for C [F(4, 300) = 8.223, p < .OOll, 
but only a significant linear trend [F(l, 300) = 29.517, p < .OOl]. For R, 
= 0.40 versus R, = 0.20, the effect for C was not significant [F(4, 304) 
= 1.808, p > .lO]. 
These results support the first hypothesis, that ambiguity avoidance 
increases with C, for range comparisons of R, = 0.20 versus R, = 0.00 
and R, = 0.40 versus R, = 0.00. This relationship did not obtain for R, 
= 0.40 versus R, = 0.20, a result to which we return in the next section. 
The second hypothesis concerned the existence of ambiguity indiffer- 
ence and ambiguity seeking behaviors for low values of C. A region of 
ambiguity indifference was identified, in that the null hypothesis of no 
282 CURLEY AND YATES 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 1 
Interval Center (C) 
FIG. 5. Mean strength of preference ratings as a function of the interval center C for 
three combinations of range comparison: R, = 0.20 versus R, = 0.00; R, = 0.40 versus 
R, = 0.00; and R, = 0.40 versus R, = 0.20. The dashed line indicates the point of ambiguity 
indifference. 
reaction to ambiguity was not rejected. For both the pairs with R, = 0.20 
versus R, = 0.00 and with R, = 0.40 versus R, = 0.00, ambiguity in- 
difference was accepted for values of C G 0.40 [two-tailed t, p > .OS]. 
For values of C 3 0.45, ambiguity avoidance predominated [p < .Ol]. 
This same pattern obtained for pairs with R, = 0.40 versus R, = 0.20, 
but recall that the C effect in this case was not significant. For no values 
of C, even at the smallest value of C = 0.10, was ambiguity seeking the 
significantly prevalent behavior. 
Effect of the Interval Range 
The range of the probability interval was varied from R = 0.00 to R 
= 1.00 at a fixed value of C = 0.50. The mean strength of preference 
ratings and percentages of subjects choosing the less ambiguous lottery, 
that having range R,, are indicated in Table 1 for all the ranges R, and R, 
used in the study at C = 0.50. A one-way ANOVA applied to the ratings 
did not indicate a significant difference in these mean values [F(.5, 380) 
= 1.199, p > .25]. Still, the extent of ambiguity avoidance was sizeable. 
AMBIGUITY PREFERENCE EFFECTS 283 
I  
I  1 1 I  I  I  
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 1 
Interval Center (C) 
FIG. 6. Percentages of subjects choosing the less ambiguous lottery (RJ in each pair as 
a function of the interval center C for three combinations of range comparison: R, = 0.20 
versus Rz = 0.00; R, = 0.40 versus R, = 0.00; and R, = 0.40 versus R? = 0.20. The 
dashed line indicates the point of ambiguity indifference. 
Even the lowest mean rating, that for R, = 0.40 versus R, = 0.20, sig- 
nificantly differed from 0 [two-tailed t, p < .Ol]. Similar conclusions were 
indicated by analyses of the choice frequencies. 
Our reanalysis of the data reported by Becker and Brownson (1964) 
did reveal a significant effect of varying the ranges R, and R, [F(9, 126) 
= 11.164, I, < .OOl]. This range interval effect in their data was not 
replicated in the present study. The pattern of their data, however, is 
consistent with that obtained in the present study, shown in Table 1. 
Namely, the extent of ambiguity avoidance monotonically increases both 
as R, increases, holding R, constant, and as R, decreases, holding R, 
constant. 
Of additional interest is the difference in subjects’ responses between 
situations with R, = 0.20 versus R, = 0.00 and those with R, = 0.40 
versus R, = 0.20 (see Figs. 5 and 6). Becker and Brownson (1964) pro- 
posed that the extent of ambiguity avoidance, under the present condi- 
tions, is an approximately linear function of the difference R, - R,. The 
present data, in which both situations share the value R, - Rz = 0.20, 
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TABLE 1 
MEAN STRENGTH OF PREFERENCE RATINGS AND CHOICE PERCENTAGES FOR LOTTERIES 
CENTERED AT C = 0.50 WITH RANGES R, AND R, 
RI 

























(1 High ratings favor the less ambiguous lottery, that with range R,. 
cast doubt upon this hypothesis. In particular, an interaction between the 
center C and the ranges R, and R, is indicated. This was verified with a 
two-way ANOVA applied to the ratings data for the 3 x 5 factorial design 
embedded in the complete set of lottery pairs shown in Fig. 4. The pairs 
in the design are those having centers of C = 0.20, 0.40, 0.50, 0.60, 0.80 
and having paired ranges of RI = 0.20 versus R, = 0.00; R, = 0.40 
versus R, = 0.00; and R, = 0.40 versus R, = 0.20. The mean responses 
to these pairs form a subset of the points shown in Fig. 5. The analysis 
indicated a significant main effect for the interval center C [F(4, 304) = 
11.48, p < .OOl] and a significant interaction of the interval center C and 
the range pair R, and R, [F(8, 608) = 2.04, p < .05]. The main effect for 
the ranges was not significant [F(2, 152) = 1.94, p > .lO]. 
DISCUSSION 
The major results of the study are summarized relative to the predic- 
tions expressed in the models previously presented. First, the extent of 
ambiguity avoidance was found to increase with the probability interval 
center C for range pairs R, = 0.20 versus R, = 0.00 and RI = 0.40 versus 
R, = 0.00, but not for pairs R, = 0.40 versus R, = 0.20. Although not 
part of Ellsberg’s original formulation (1961), this finding is consistent 
with his later comments (Becker & Brownson, 1964). It also agrees with 
Einhorn and Hogarth’s (in press) and Gardenfors and Sahlin’s (1982, 
1983) explicit prediction of a relationship between ambiguity avoidance 
and C. However, the failure to find such a relationship for pairs in which 
R, = 0.40 and R, = 0.20 is troublesome to these models. 
Second, for values of C s 0.40, ambiguity avoidance was not signifi- 
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cantly the most prevalent behavior; however, for no values of C used in 
the study (C 3 . 10) was ambiguity seeking predominant. This finding fails 
to substantiate the additional conjecture of Ellsberg (Becker & 
Brownson, 1964) that ambiguity seeking might predominate for small 
values of C. Perhaps this hypothesis remains viable for values of C 
smaller than those studied here. However, note that, in lotteries of the 
present form, lower values of C are constrained since the interval centers 
and ranges cannot be manipulated completely independently of each 
other. At the extreme, lottery pairs having R, - R, = 1 .OO can only have 
interval centers at C = 0.50. Similarly, lottery pairs centered at C < 0.10 
have a maximum value of R, - R, = 2C < 0.20. This constraint limits 
further pursuit of this issue by means of the present procedure. 
Third, no main effect of interval ranges on ambiguity preferences was 
found; but a significant C x (RI, R2) interaction did obtain. Furthermore, 
knowledge of the range difference R, - R, was not sufficient to account 
for the observed effect. This clearly contradicts both of the stated claims 
of the Becker and Brownson (1964) study: (a) that ambiguity, in situations 
like these, is a simple function of the range, and (b) that ambiguity avoid- 
ance is a function of the difference R, - R,. Of these two, the claim of 
the sufficiency of R, - R,, although stated, was not explicitly tested by 
those authors and it is not a necessary conclusion of their data or analysis. 
Our finding of an absence of a range effect, however, is clearly inconsis- 
tent with their data, as well as the predictions of Ellsberg’s model (1961) 
and of the models related to it. 
It is worth reiteration, in discussing possible range effects, that the 
interval centers and ranges are not independent in the present procedure. 
In general, highly discrepant values of R, and R, are achievable only for 
intermediate values of C. Thus, any effects on ambiguity preferences of 
the interval ranges have an applicable domain which is limited to alter- 
natives with nonextreme interval centers. So, it is likely that for de- 
cisions in a natural environment, any main effect of R, and R, may be 
negligible under certain conditions. Still, to be noted is that the difference 
between R, and R, consistently elicits reaction; ambiguity avoidance, 
not ambiguity indifference, predominated for all levels of R, and R, at 
c = 0.50. 
Of further interest is the observed interaction effect. One possible in- 
terpretation of this result is that subjects’ reactions to ambiguity vary 
with C only when one of the alternatives has no ambiguity, that is, when 
R, = 0, independent of the magnitude of R,. Although the data so sug- 
gest, this strong interpretation is premature. The reanalysis of the Becker 
and Brownson (1964) data does not support this conclusion; and, com- 
bined with the consistency of the pattern of results in Table 1 with their 
data, the above hypothesis remains to be proven. 
286 CURLEY AND YATES 
Regarding the methodology of this experiment, in contrast to studies 
such as those of Becker and Brownson (1964) and Yates and Zukowski 
(1976), rating scales rather than a pricing paradigm were used to obtain 
measures of strength of preference. The rating scale measure was sug- 
gested by a preliminary version of the present experiment that we per- 
formed using pricing techniques derived from Becker, DeGroot, and Mar- 
schak (1964). That earlier experiment demonstrated the asymmetry of 
allowable prices that obtains for lotteries not having interval centers of 
C = 0.50. To illustrate, for C = 0.30, a person setting the value of a 
lottery at less than its “expectation” of (0.3O)$W (refer to Fig. 1) has a 
smaller interval within which to express a strength of preference than an 
individual setting the value of the same lottery at more than (0.3O)W. 
This fact is inconsequential if one can assume an expectation theory of 
decision such as SEU; however, as Ellsberg (1961) and others have dem- 
onstrated, such a theory cannot describe people’s behavior in ambiguous 
situations. Thus, a pricing response method would run the clear risk of 
systematic bias; this eventuality does not pertain to the rating response 
method which was employed. 
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